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1 Introduction
The last four decades have witnessed the increasing integration of different
national economies and the widespread adoption of ‘neoliberal’ policies. This
phenomenon, often labelled ‘globalisation’, has far-reaching economic, social,
and political implications, and has stimulated a vast debate. Globalisation
has significant effects within each economy, but special attention has been
paid to its repercussions on the relations between developed and less de-
veloped countries. For although many poor countries have benefited from
trade and have experienced spectacular growth, which has lifted a big part
of the world population above the poverty line, globalisation has also been
characterised by the economic stagnation of backward areas, large inequali-
ties in income and standard of living among countries, and asymmetries in
bargaining power in the international arena.
Unsurprisingly, different schools of thought have emphasised different as-
pects of the global economy. Radical authors and the so-called dependence
school have historically emphasised the inequalities that characterise inter-
national relations as a product of exploitative relations between rich and
poor nations.1 In his classic work, for example, Arghiri Emmanuel [8] has
argued that the core-periphery structure of international relations generates
an unequal exchange (UE) between rich and poor nations. According to Em-
manuel, in a world economy characterised by institutionalised wage differen-
tials between developed and less developed nations, the international trade of
commodities and capital mobility across borders cause a transfer of surplus
labour from poor nations with lower capital-labour ratios to wealthy nations
with higher capital-labour ratios, which results in the impoverishment of the
former to the advantage of the latter.
In contrast, the conventional view emphasises the positive effects of glob-
alisation and various authors have questioned the empirical and theoretical
relevance of UE theory. Empirically, for example, Ben-David ([3], p.653) has
argued that evidence suggests that “movement toward free trade may actu-
ally have just the opposite effect [than predicted by UE theory], leading to
a reduction in income disparity among countries”.2 Theoretically, UE the-
ory is criticised because it is inconsistent with the principle of comparative
1The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. We refer the reader
to the excellent reviews by Bacha [2] and Griffin and Gurley [12].
2Yet, recent empirical studies reach exactly the opposite conclusion. See, for example,
Slaughter [27].
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advantage, according to which profit equalisation and capital flows from rich
to poor countries have growth-inducing and inequality-reducing effects.3 In-
terestingly, however, both the ‘dependence school’ and mainstream authors
suggest that any increase in international inequalities should be attributed to
some major imperfections in global markets, such as institutionalised wage
differentials, increasing returns to scale, wealth-dependent borrowing con-
straints in international financial markets, and so on.4
In a seminal contribution, Roemer [23] has provided a rigorous, consistent
definition of UE, and an elegant analysis of UE between countries, in a sta-
tic model with revenue-maximising countries and a Leontief technology. He
has shown that even assuming perfectly competitive global commodity and
credit markets, the international economy is characterised by the emergence
of classes in the credit market and UE exploitative relations. In equilibrium,
the world economy is characterised both by mutual gains from trade and
by asymmetric international relations because the economic development of
less developed countries is crucially dependent on capital exports from devel-
oped countries, and surplus is transferred from the former to the latter via
international capital markets. “Unequal exchange does not preempt mutual
gains from trade” (Roemer [23], p.35).5 Thus, Roemer [23] helps to clarify
the scope both of the standard, neoclassical approach to free trade and of the
UE theory of international relations. Crucially, deviations from competitive
assumptions and market imperfections are unessential for his results: un-
equal and asymmetric relations between countries “can be entirely explained
by differential capital-labor ratios across countries” (Roemer [23], p.34).
As insightful as Roemer’s [22, 23] contributions are, it is still an open
question whether UE theory provides a general framework to analyse inter-
national relations. It is not clear, for example, whether Roemer’s key con-
clusions hold under more general assumptions concerning preferences and
technology, and outside of static, one-period models (or, at least, outside of
what may be interpreted as stationary equilibria of dynamic models). In
later contributions, Roemer himself has raised doubts on the generality of
3See, for example, the debate between Paul Samuelson and Arghiri Emmanuel in The
Journal of International Economics in 1978.
4The literatue is vast here, too. See, among the many others, the classic contributions
by Krugman [13] and Matsuyama [16], and the comprehensive discussion in Raj [21].
5This insight is compatible with the classical Marxian theory of exploitation, as Marx
([15], chapter 20, (e)) notes that “a richer country exploits a poorer one, even when the
latter benefits from the exchange.”
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UE theory,6 and on the possibility of identifying a rigorous definition of UE
exploitation that captures our fundamental normative intuitions.
In this paper, we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of a global
economy, which generalises Roemer’s [23] economies, in order to analyse the
robustness of UE theory and how unequal international relations may arise
in a competitive setting. We extend Roemer’s [22, 23] analysis in two main
directions. Formally, the model incorporates more general assumptions on
preferences - by assuming that countries welfare depends both on consump-
tion and on leisure - and on technology - by allowing for convex production
sets. Furthermore, we analyse international relations in a general dynamic
context by explicitly considering intertemporal decisions and by focusing on
general equilibria, without restricting attention to stationary states.
Methodologically, instead of analysing international relations based on a
specific definition of UE exploitation, we start from first principles and adopt
a novel axiomatic approach to UE theory.7 We formalise three fundamen-
tal intuitions of UE theory. The first one, called Labour Exploitation (LE),
is a domain axiom that captures some basic properties defining the core of
UE theory that all admissible definitions should (and all of the main defi-
nitions do) satisfy. Intuitively, according to LE, exploitative international
relations are characterised by systematic differences between the labour per-
formed by agents in a country ν and the amount of labour ‘contained’ in
some reference commodity bundles that capture consumption possibilities
of citizens in ν.8 The other two properties, called the Wealth-Exploitation
Correspondence Principle (WECP) and the Class-Exploitation Correspon-
dence Principle (CECP) capture axiomatically two fundamental intuitions
of UE theory originally introduced by Roemer [22, 23], who proved them to
hold in certain economies, under specific UE definitions. TheWECP states
that the exploitation status of countries in the international arena should
be determined by their level of development (proxied by the value of their
productive endowments). According to the CECP, a correspondence should
exist between a country’s status in the international capital market and its
6For example, Roemer [24]. See Veneziani [29] for a thorough discussion.
7We have applied the axiomatic method to exploitation theory in other contributions
(see, for example, [32, 34, 31]). In this paper, however, we extend the analysis to dynamic
economies and consider a different set of axioms.
8A rigorous statement of LE - and of the other axioms - is in section 4. This charac-
terisation is conceptually related to the classic theories of unequal exchange (Emmanuel
[8]) and underdevelopment (Amin [1], Frank [9]).
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exploitation status: in equilibrium, nations that can only optimise by lending
capital on the credit market should emerge as UE exploiters, whereas nations
that can only optimise by borrowing capital should be UE exploited.
We derive a complete characterisation of the class of definitions of UE
exploitation that satisfy all three axioms in general dynamic equilibria of
the international economy. Then, we prove that this class is nonempty: a
definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [32, 34, 31] based
on the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [5, 6]; Foley [10, 11]; Duménil et al
[7]) satisfies all three properties. Contrary to the received view, a rigorous
and logically consistent definition of unequal, exploitative exchange exists,
which is firmly anchored to empirically observable data and generalises the
key insights of UE theory to general, dynamic international economies.
To be sure, this does not fully answer the question of the normative
relevance of UE and the wrongfulness of exploitative international relations.
Yet the rigorous, axiomatic characterisation of a nonempty class of definitions
that preserve some key insights of UE theory is a crucial first step in order
to address that question. In the Appendix we briefly elaborate on this issue
and explore some of the normative implications of UE theory in a general
dynamic setting.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a set N = {1, ..., N} of countries, with generic
element ν, in which a sequence of nonoverlapping generations exist, each
living for T periods,9 and indexed by the date of birth kT , k = 0, 1, 2, ... In
every period t, countries consume n produced commodities, and leisure.
Technology is freely available to all countries: in every period t, capitalists
in each country can operate any activity in the production set P ⊆ R2n+1,
with elements of the form α = (−αl,−α,α), where αl ∈ R+ is the direct
labour input; α ∈ Rn+ are the inputs of the n goods; and α ∈ Rn+ are the
outputs of the n goods. The net output vector arising from α is denoted
as bα ≡ α − α. Let 0 be the null vector. The set P is assumed to be a
closed convex cone containing the origin in R2n+1, and to satisfy the following
standard properties.10
9Unless otherwise specified, our results hold both if T is finite and if it is infinite. In
the latter case, only one infinitely-lived generation exists.
10Vector inequalities: for all x, y ∈ Rp, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , p); x ≥ y
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Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P , if α ≥ 0 then αl > 0 and α ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rn+ , there exists α ∈ P such that bα = c.
Assumption 3 (A3). For all α ∈ P , and for all (−α0,α0) ∈ Rn− × Rn+ , if
(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) then (−αl,−α0,α0) ∈ P .
A1 implies that some labour and some capital are indispensable to produce
any output; A2 states that any non-negative commodity bundle is producible
as net output; A3 is a standard free disposal condition. The set of produc-
tively efficient activities is ∂P = {α ∈ P : @α0 ∈ P such that α0 > α} .
Commodities and capital can freely migrate across borders, while labour is
immobile. In every t, (pt, rt) is the 1×(n+1) international price vector, where
pt denotes the prices of the n commodities and rt is the interest rate that
prevails in competitive capital markets. In order to focus on international
inequalities, agents are assumed to be identical within each country; thus,
the superscript ν denotes both a country and its representative agent.
Following Roemer [22, 23], we explicitly model the time structure of in-
dividual exchange and production decisions, and incorporate the fact that
production takes time. To be specific, each production period t is divided
into two stages: the capital market and the market for productive assets
operate at the beginning of t, where goods are exchanged at the prices pt−1
ruling at the end of t − 1 and beginning of t. Thus, at the beginning of
every period t, ωνt is the vector of productive assets owned by ν, - where ωνkT
denotes the endowments inherited when born in kT , - and the market value
of ν’s endowments, ν’s wealth, is W νt = pt−1ωνt .
At the beginning of every t, each ν ∈ N can borrow an amount pt−1βνt on
the international credit market to purchase βν
t
in order to operate production
activity βνt =
³
−βνlt,−βνt , β
ν
t
´
∈ P . Otherwise, it can use its wealth W νt ei-
ther to purchase capital goods ανt to operate activity ανt = (−ανlt,−ανt ,ανt ) ∈
P ; or to buy commodities δνt ∈ Rn+ to be stored and sold at the end of the
period; or to lend capital zνt ∈ R+ abroad.
Because production takes time, output is exchanged on the final goods
market at the end of t, at end-of-period prices pt. For each country ν ∈
N , proceedings from production are given by pt
³
ανt + β
ν
t
´
and the return
to lending zνt is (1 + rt) z
ν
t , thus gross national income at the end of t is
pt
³
ανt + β
ν
t
´
+(1 + rt) z
ν
t from which the rental cost of the borrowed capital
if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , p).
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(1 + rt) pt−1βνt must be paid. The rest of ν’s income can be used to purchase
consumption goods cνt ∈ Rn+ and to finance accumulation ωνt+1 ∈ Rn+ .
Given production decisions (ανt ,βνt ), in every period t, the total amount of
labour performed by agents in ν ∈ N is given by Λνt = ανlt+βνlt and it cannot
exceed ν’s endowment, Lν. For simplicity, and without loss of generality,
all countries are assumed to be endowed with the same amount of labour
Lν = L > 0. Therefore for each ν ∈ N , leisure enjoyed at t is lνt = L− Λνt ,
and we assume that country ν’s welfare at t can be represented by a function
u : Rn+ × [0, L] → R+: u(ct, lt) can be interpreted either as a standard
neoclassical utility function or as an objectivist index of primary goods, or
capabilities. The latter interpretation is more in line with exploitation theory,
but the two interpretations are formally equivalent.11
In order to characterise the structure of international relations and the
dynamic pattern of exploitation and classes, it is necessary to impose some
structure on the function u. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
u(ct, lt) = φ (L− Λt) + v(ct), where v : Rn+ → R and φ : [0, L] → R are
strictly increasing and twice differentiable. Furthermore, in order to avoid
a number of unnecessary technicalities, we shall assume that v is strictly
quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree one, while φ is strictly concave
with limΛ→0 φ0 (L− Λ) = 0 and limΛ→L φ0 (L− Λ) =∞.
These assumptions significantly generalise the canonical models of ex-
ploitation theory by Roemer [22, 23], and are standard in international eco-
nomics - and specifically, in the literature on Heckscher-Ohlin models (see,
for example, Chen [4]). The assumptions on φ rule out rather implausible
equilibria with countries performing zero labour, or enjoying no leisure at all.
Further, as forcefully argued by Silvestre [26], it is theoretically appropriate
to assume v to be linearly homogeneous if an objectivist view is adopted
and u is interpreted as an objectivist welfare index.12 It is worth stressing,
however, that the restrictions on u are imposed mostly for technical conve-
nience, and the main results of this paper can be derived under more general
assumptions, albeit at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities.13
11For a discussion of subjective and objective principles, see Roemer and Veneziani [25]
and, in the context of exploitation theory, Yoshihara and Veneziani [35].
12Even if u is interpreted as a subjective welfare index, the assumptions seem reason-
able, given that u represents the welfare of a nation, which depends on the country’s
consumption expenditure (and national income), and working hours.
13For example, it is possible to allow for heterogeneous preferences over consumption
goods with uν (cνt , l
ν
t ) = φ (L− Λνt )+ vν (cνt ); a weakly concave φ; v being homogeneous of
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Let cν = {cνt }
(k+1)T−1
t=kT be ν’s lifetime consumption plan; and likewise for
αν ,βν , zν , δν , and Λν , and let ων =
©
ωνt+1
ª(k+1)T−1
t=kT
be ν’s lifetime accumu-
lation plan. Let (p, r) = {(pt, rt)}
(k+1)T−1
t=kT be the path of international price
vectors during the lifetime of a generation. Let ξν = (αν ,βν , zν , δν , cν ,ων )
denote a generic intertemporal plan for ν. Let 0 < ρ 5 1 be the time pref-
erence factor. Each ν is assumed to choose ξν to maximise welfare subject
to the constraints that in every t, (1) gross national income is sufficient for
consumption and accumulation; (2) wealth is sufficient for production and
lending; (3) production activities are technologically feasible. Finally, (4)
reproducibility requires resources not to be depleted: generation k is con-
strained to bequeath at least as much wealth as they inherited. Formally,
each ν solves programme MP ν .14
MP ν : V (ωνkT ) = maxξν
(k+1)T−1X
t=kT
ρtu (cνt , lνt ) ,
subject to: for every t = kT , . . . ,(k + 1)T − 1,
ptανt +
h
ptβ
ν
t − (1 + rt) pt−1βνt
i
+ (1 + rt) z
ν
t + ptδνt = ptcνt + ptωνt+1, (1)
pt−1 (ανt + δνt ) + zνt = pt−1ωνt , (2)
ανt ,βνt ∈ P , Λνt 5 L, (3)
p(k+1)T−1ων(k+1)T = p(k+1)T−1ωνkT . (4)
MP ν is a suitable way of modelling country ν’s decision problem, given the
representative-agent assumption, and it generalises Roemer’s [22, 23] static
models in which countries maximise national income.
In order to capture the role of financial markets in exploitative interna-
tional relations, only short-term credit contracts are considered as in Roemer
[22, 23]: within each period, countries can operate on the international cap-
ital market to finance their production plans, but contracts do not extend
over time and credit plays a limited role in fostering accumulation. Con-
sumption, debt, and savings must be financed out of current revenue. Due
to the possibility of saving, and noting that net savings are allowed to be
degree k < 1; and so on.
14The first two constraints are written as equalities without loss of generality, given the
monotonicity of u.
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negative, however, Roemer’s [22, 23] static models are generalised by allow-
ing for intertemporal trade-offs within a country, consistently with a dynamic
setting in which agents live for more than one period.
For all ν ∈ N , let Oν (p, r) be the set of vectors ξν that solve MP ν at
prices (p, r). Let ΩkT =
¡
ω1kT ,ω2kT , ...,ωNkT
¢
. Let E (P,N , u, ρ,ΩkT ), or as a
shorthand notation E(ΩkT ), denote the international economy with technol-
ogy P , countriesN , welfare function u with discount factor ρ, and productive
endowments ΩkT . Let ct =
P
ν∈N c
ν
t ; and likewise for all other variables. For
the sake of simplicity, let “for all t” stand for “for all t = kT, . . . , (k+1)T−1”.
Following Roemer [22, 23], the equilibrium concept can now be defined.15
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(ΩkT ) is a price vector
(p, r) and an associated profile of actions (ξν )ν∈N such that:
(i) ξν ∈ Oν (p, r) for all ν ∈ N ;
(ii) αt + βt + δt = ct + ωt+1 for all t;
(iii) αt + βt + δt 5 ωt for all t;
(iv) pt−1βt = zt for all t;
(v) ω(k+1)T = ωkT .
In other words, at a RS, (i) every country optimises. Conditions (ii) and (iii)
are standard excess demand conditions in the markets for final goods and
capital goods respectively: in each market, aggregate demand should not
exceed aggregate supply in any period. Condition (iii) also ensures that in
each period, aggregate production is feasible given the stock of capital goods.
Condition (iv) requires that the international credit market clears in every
period. Finally, reproducibility - condition (v) - requires that every gener-
ation leaves to the following at least as many resources as they inherited.
This is a standard condition in Ramsey-type growth models with a finite
horizon (see, for example, Morishima’s [18] classic model) and it is quite nat-
ural given that countries - rather than individuals - are the focus of analysis.
For, although each generation dies, the country itself exists across successive
generations, and so its capital stock should not be depleted.
In the rest of this section, we derive some preliminary results that describe
the characteristics of the equilibria of the international economy. In what
follows, even if it is not explicitly stated, we shall focus only on non-trivial
RS’s in which some production takes place in every period.
15The existence of a reproducible solution is proved in the Addendum.
9
First of all, the strict monotonicity of v implies that at any RS, it must be
pt > 0 for all t. Moreover, at a non-trivial RS, it must be maxα∈P\{0} ptα−
(1 + rt) pt−1α = 0 at all t. To see this, note that if maxα∈P\{0} ptα −
(1 + rt) pt−1α < 0 at some t, then at the solution to MP ν it must be
ανt = βνt = 0 for all ν ∈ N , contradicting the assumption that the RS is
non-trivial. This implies that at a non-trivial RSmaxα∈P\{0}
ptα
pt−1α = (1 + rt),
all t, which in turn implies that maxα∈P\{0}
ptα
pt−1α = maxi
pit
pit−1
, all t. For if
there were some commodity i such that pit
pit−1
> maxα∈P\{0}
ptα
pt−1α = (1 + rt)
at some t, then at the solution to MP ν it would be ανt = 0 and zνt = 0
for all ν ∈ N . By Definition 1(iv), this implies that βνt = 0 for all ν ∈ N ,
contradicting the assumption that the RS is non-trivial.
Given (p, r), at any t, let wmaxt = maxα∈P
ptα−(1+rt)pt−1α
αl : by the assump-
tions on P , wmaxt is well-defined. Hence let P
w
t (p, r) =
n
α ∈ P | wmaxt = ptα−(1+rt)pt−1ααl
o
.
Proposition 1 proves that only processes with the highest return to labour
are activated and, as is well-known in international economics, even without
an international labour market, wages are equalised in all countries at all t.
Proposition 1: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS for E(ΩkT ). Then, wmaxt > 0
for all t, and ανt , βνt ∈ Pwt (p, r) for all ν and all t.
Proof: 1. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that wmaxt 5 0 for some t.
Then, by A1, at the solution to MP ν , it must be ανt = βνt = 0 for all ν,
which contradicts the nontriviality of the RS.
2. The second part of the statement follows immediately from MP ν .
Lemma 1 proves a useful property of the set of solutions of MP ν .
Lemma 1: Let (p, r) be a price vector such that wmaxt > 0 for all t. For all
ν ∈ N , if (αν , βν , zν , δν , cν ,ων ) solves MP ν , then (α0ν , β0ν , z0ν , δν , cν ,ων )
also solves MP ν whenever α0νt + β0νt = ανt +βνt , z0νt + pt−1α0νt = zνt + pt−1ανt ,
α0νt ,β0νt ∈ P , and z0νt = 0, all t.
Proof: By construction, it is immediate to check that the constraints ofMP ν
are all satisfied. Furthermore, β0νlt + α0νlt = βνlt + ανlt, at all t and c0ν = cν .
Hence (α0ν , β0ν , z0ν , δν , cν ,ων ) yields the same welfare.
By Lemma 1, and the convexity of P , we can consider solutions ofMP ν with
αν = 0, without loss of generality.
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At the solution to MP ν , p(k+1)T−1ων(k+1)T = p(k+1)T−1ωνkT for all ν and
all k. Therefore, at a RS, ω(k+1)T = ωkT since p(k+1)T−1 > 0. Moreover,
ων(k+1)T = ωνkT is feasible and optimal for any ν ∈ N . Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can focus on solutions with ων(k+1)T = ωνkT . Hence, if¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
is a RS for E(ΩkT ), then it is also a RS for E(Ω(k+1)T ), and
in what follows generation k = 0 can be considered without loss of generality.
A subset of equilibria that are of particular interest are those where agents
optimise at an interior solution. Thus:
Definition 2: An interior RS (IRS) for E(ΩkT ) is a RS such that for all ν,
ξν ∈ Oν (p, r) is an interior solution to MP ν with cνt > 0 for all t.
The next result proves a necessary condition for an IRS.
Lemma 2: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0). Then for all ν ∈ N ,
Λν = Λ∗ = {Λ∗t}
(k+1)T−1
t=kT where
φ0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
= ρ(1 + rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
, for all t.
Proof: 1. By Proposition 1, for all ν ∈ N , at the solution toMP ν , it must be
(1 + rt) pt−1ωνt +wmaxt Λνt = ptct+ptωνt+1, all t. Then it is immediate to prove
that, at an interior solution ξν ∈ Oν (p, r) toMP ν , for all t and all ν ∈ N , it
must be
v0i(c
∗ν
t )
v0j(c
∗ν
t )
= pit
pjt
and φ0 (L− Λ∗νt ) = wmaxt v
0
i(c
∗ν
t )
pit
for all i, j. By the linear
homogeneity of v(.), this implies that at an interior solution to MP ν , at all
t, it must be
c∗νit
c∗νjt
=
c
∗μ
it
c
∗μ
jt
for all ν,μ ∈ N , and therefore v0i (c∗νt ) = v0i (c∗μt ) and
φ0 (L− Λ∗νt ) = φ0 (L− Λ∗μt ) for all ν,μ ∈ N . The first part of the statement
then follows from the strict concavity of φ.
2. At any t, let c∗t ∈ Rn+ be such that v
0
i(c
∗
t )
v0j(c
∗
t )
= pit
pjt
, for all i, j. Then by step
1, at an IRS, it must be c∗νt = k
ν
t c
∗
t where k
ν
t =
(1+rt)pt−1ωνt +wmaxt Λ∗t−ptωνt+1
ptc
∗
t
> 0,
at all t and for all ν ∈ N . Take any two adjacent periods t,t+1, and consider
ν ∈ N such that ptωνt+1 > 0. Consider a small one-period perturbation of
ων such that dkνt = − 1ptc∗t ptdω
ν
t+1 and dk
ν
t+1 =
(1+rt+1)
pt+1c
∗
t+1
ptdωνt+1. By the linear
homogeneity of v, the resulting change in welfare is v(c∗t )dk
ν
t +ρv(c∗t+1)dkνt+1 =
−v(c∗t ) 1ptc∗t ptdω
ν
t+1 + v(c
∗
t+1)ρ (1+rt+1)pt+1c∗t+1 ptdω
ν
t+1.
3. By step 1, at an IRS, at all t, φ0 (L− Λ∗t ) = wmaxt v
0
i(c
∗ν
t )
pit
for all i and
all ν ∈ N . By the linear homogeneity of v, this implies that φ0 (L− Λ∗t ) =
wmaxt
v(c∗νt )
ptc
∗ν
t
= wmaxt
v(c∗t )
ptc
∗
t
. Using the latter expression, the change in welfare can
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be written equivalently as −φ0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
ptdωνt+1 + ρ (1 + rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
ptdωνt+1.
Therefore a necessary condition for ξν ∈ Oν (p, r) to be an interior solution
toMP ν is that
∙
−φ0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
+ ρ(1 + rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
¸
ptdωνt+1 5 0 for all dωνt+1,
which holds only if the expression in brackets is equal to zero.
The condition in Lemma 2 is the Euler equation deriving from MP ν .
Observe that if φ assumed to be concave but not necessarily strictly so, each
country ν may have a continuum of optimal values of Λν , but it would still
be optimal for all countries to choose the common intertemporal profile of
labour supply identified in Lemma 2.
3 The International Class Structure
As a first step in the analysis of the structure of international relations, we
derive the international class structure, where “classes of countries can be
defined with reference to the use of the credit market” (Roemer [23], p.54).
Let (a1, a2, a3) be a vector where ai ∈ {+,0}, i = 1, 3, a2 ∈ {+, 0}, and
“+” means a non-zero vector in the appropriate place. Let Aν =
PT−1
t=0 ανt ,
Bν =
PT−1
t=0 βνt , and Zν =
PT−1
t=0 z
ν
t . Because agents live for more than one
period, there are two extensions of Roemer’s definition of classes.
Definition 3: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS for E(Ω0). Country ν is said to
be a member of WPt class (a1, a2, a3) in t, if there is a ξ0ν ∈ Oν (p, r) with
ω0ν = ων such that (α0νt , z0νt ,β0νt ) has the form (a1, a2, a3) in t. Similarly, ν
is said to be a member of WL class (a1, a2, a3), if there is a ξ0ν ∈ Oν (p, r)
such that (A0ν , Z 0ν , B0ν ) has the form (a1, a2, a3).
There are eight conceivable classes (a1, a2, a3) for each definition, but only
four of them are theoretically relevant, as forcefully argued by Roemer [22].
At a RS
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
forE(Ω0), let Γν = {(A0ν , Z 0ν , B0ν ) | ξ0ν ∈ Oν (p, r)},
and at all t, Γνt = {(α0νt , z0νt , β0νt ) | ξ0ν ∈ Oν (p, r) with ω0ν = ων}. As a short-
hand, we shall say that Γν has a solution of the form (a1, a2, a3) \ (a01, a02, a03)
to mean that Γν contains a vector (A0ν , Z 0ν , B0ν ) of the form (a1, a2, a3) but
not one of the form (a01, a
0
2, a
0
3); and likewise for Γνt . Then, according to the
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WL definition:
C1 = {ν ∈ N | Γν has a solution of the form (+,+,0) \ (+, 0,0)} ,
C2 = {ν ∈ N | Γν has a solution of the form (+, 0,0)} ,
C3 = {ν ∈ N | Γν has a solution of the form (+, 0,+) \ (+, 0,0)} ,
C4 = {ν ∈ N | Γν has a solution of the form (0, 0,+)} .
WPt classes C
1
t −C4t are similarly specified, replacing Γν with Γνt . Countries
in C1 (resp. C1t ) are net lenders of capital in the global market; countries in
C2 (resp. C2t ) can optimise without using the capital market; countries in
C3 (resp. C3t ) must borrow foreign capital to optimise; countries in C
4 (resp.
C4t ) must borrow all of their operating capital. This definition of classes
based on credit relations conveys the intuition that a country’s position in
the capital market affects its international status.
Below, it is proved that in equilibrium the set of countries N can indeed
be partitioned into these four WPt classes at all t. First, Lemma 3 proves
that WPt classes (+,+,+) and (0,+,+) can be ignored.
Lemma 3: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0). Let ξν ∈ Oν (p, r)
be such that ν is a member of WPt class (+,+,+) or (0,+,+) in t. Then:
if z0νt > pt−1β0νt for all (α
0ν
t , z
0ν
t , β0νt ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C1t ;
if z0νt = pt−1β0νt for some (α
0ν
t , z
0ν
t ,β0νt ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C2t ;
if z0νt < pt−1β0νt for all (α
0ν
t , z
0ν
t , β0νt ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C3t .
Proof: 1. By the convexity of MP ν , it follows that if z0νt < pt−1β0νt for some
(α0νt , z0νt ,β0νt ) ∈ Γνt and z00νt > pt−1β00νt for some other (α
00ν
t , z
00ν
t ,β00νt ) ∈ Γνt ,
then there exists (α000νt , z000νt ,β000νt ) ∈ Γνt such that z000νt = pt−1β000νt . Therefore,
the three cases in the statement are mutually exclusive and they decompose
the set of agents with W νt > 0 into disjoint sets.
2. Suppose z0νt > pt−1β0νt for all (α
0ν
t , z
0ν
t , β0νt ) ∈ Γνt . Construct (α0νt , z0νt , β0νt )
such that α0νt = ανt +βνt , z0νt = zνt −pt−1βνt > 0, and β
0ν
t = 0. By the convexity
of P , α0νt ∈ P , α0νlt = ανlt+βνlt and z0νt +pt−1α0νt = zνt +pt−1ανt . Then by Lemma
1, (α0νt , z0νt , β0νt ) ∈ Γνt . Thus, it remains to show that there is no solution in
Γνt of the form (+, 0,0). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that Γνt contains a
solution of the form (+, 0,0) at t. Construct (α0νt , z0νt ,β0νt ) such that α0νt = 0,
z0νt = pt−1ανt > 0, and β0νt = ανt + βνt . Clearly, β0νt ∈ P , β0νlt = ανlt + βνlt
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and z0νt + pt−1α0νt = zνt + pt−1ανt . Then by Lemma 1, (α0νt , z0νt ,β0νt ) ∈ Γνt ,
contradicting the assumption that z0νt > pt−1β0νt for all (α
0ν
t , z
0ν
t ,β0νt ) ∈ Γνt .
3. The other two cases are proved similarly.
Lemma 3 substantiates the claim that a country’s class status is deter-
mined by its position in the capital market: net lenders form the ‘upper’
strata of the global economy, whereas net borrowers occupy ‘lower’ posi-
tions. It is therefore natural to investigate whether class status (and so a
country’s position in the credit market) is determined by its wealth.
Consider an IRS. At all t, let αmint be defined as follows: αmint ∈ Pwt (p, r),
pt−1αmint
αmin
lt
= minα∈Pwt (p,r)
h
pt−1α
αl
i
, and αminlt = Λ∗t , where Λ∗t > 0 is the op-
timal amount of labour that every ν optimally spends at t, by Lemma
2. Similarly, let αmaxt be defined as follows: αmaxt ∈ Pwt (p, r), pt−1α
max
t
αmax
lt
=
maxα∈Pwt (p,r)
h
pt−1α
αl
i
, and αmaxlt = Λ∗t . Note that pt−1αmint 5 pt−1αmaxt and
that αmint , αmaxt are well-defined. Theorem 1 generalises one of the main
results of Roemer’s theory of classes: at an IRS, WP classes are pairwise
disjoint and exhaustive, andWP class status depends on a country’s wealth.
Theorem 1 (The Dependence School Theorem): Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an
IRS for E(Ω0) such that 1 + rt > maxi pitpit−1 for all t. Then at all t:
(i) ν ∈ C1t ⇔ pt−1αmaxt < W νt ;
(ii) ν ∈ C2t ⇔ pt−1αmint 5W νt 5 pt−1αmaxt ;
(iii) ν ∈ C3t ⇔ 0 < W νt < pt−1αmint ;
(iv) ν ∈ C4t ⇔W νt = 0.
Proof: 1. By Lemma 2, at an IRS, Λνt = Λ∗t = ανlt + βνlt > 0, all ν ∈ N .
2. By step 1, it immediately follows that at any t, ν ∈ C4t if and only if
W νt = 0.
3. Consider part (ii). Suppose pt−1αmint 5W νt 5 pt−1αmaxt . We show that Γνt
has a solution of the form (+, 0,0). By step 1, and noting that 1+ rt > 0, at
an IRS it must be wmaxt Λ∗t+(1 + rt)W νt = ptc∗νt +ptωνt+1, and any (α0νt , z0νt , β0νt )
with α0νt , β0νt ∈ Pwt (p, r), α0νlt + β0νlt = Λ∗t , z0νt = 0, and pt−1α0νt + z0νt = W νt
is part of an optimal solution. But then, since pt−1αmint 5 W νt 5 pt−1αmaxt ,
by the convexity of P , it follows that there exists some α00νt ∈ Pwt (p, r),
such that wmaxt α00νlt + (1 + rt) pt−1α00νt = ptc∗νt + ptωνt+1, with α00νlt = Λ∗t and
pt−1α00νt = W νt . Conversely, suppose that ν ∈ C2t , so that Γνt has a solution
of the form (+, 0,0). This implies that there exists αt ∈ Pwt (p, r) such that
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(1 + rt) pt−1αt + wmaxt αlt = ptc∗νt + ptωνt+1, with pt−1αt = W νt and αlt = Λ∗t ,
which implies pt−1αmint 5W νt 5 pt−1αmaxt .
4. Parts (i) and (iii) are proved similarly.
In order to interpret Theorem 1, note that country ν’s wealth, W νt =
pt−1ωνt , can be seen as the main proxy for its level of development. A higher
W νt is associated to advanced countries, less developed countries are charac-
terised by a lowerW νt , and “non-capitalist strata and countries” (Luxemburg
[14], p.352) have W νt = 0. Theorem 1 implies that in equilibrium less de-
veloped countries are net borrowers, whereas developed countries are net
lenders: a nation’s wealth (and development) level determines its class sta-
tus. Given thatE(Ω0) is an international economy with perfectly competitive
markets for commodities and capital, in equilibrium all countries enjoy bene-
fits from trade, as international capital flows allow poor countries to improve
their lot. Yet, the IRS is also characterised by a four-class structure which
reflects the wealth hierarchy and an asymmetric relationship between coun-
tries. For the economic development of the countries in C3t ∪ C4t is crucially
dependent on the existence of the rich countries in C1t who can export their
capital to the poor, whereas the rich in C1t could realise a certain economic
development with full employment by themselves alone. In this sense, Theo-
rem 1 captures some of the key insights of the ‘dependence school’ discussed
in the Introduction, and therefore it is named accordingly.
4 Exploitative International Relations
Exploitation in international relations is conceived of as the unequal exchange
of labour between countries, which is defined following Roemer [22, 23]: ex-
ploitative international relations are characterised by systematic differences
between the labour ‘contributed’, in some relevant sense, by agents in coun-
try ν and the labour ‘received’, in some relevant sense, by them via their
national income. As intuitive as this definition may seem at first sight, in
general economies, the notions of labour contributed and labour received are
not obvious. Indeed, the very existence of a general, consistent definition
which preserves the key insights of UE theory has been put into doubt. In
this section, we develop an axiomatic analysis of UE exploitation theory and
characterise a class of definitions that satisfy three important properties. In
the next section, we prove that the class is nonempty.
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4.1 A domain axiom
In order to define UE exploitation, it is necessary to identify both the labour
‘contributed’ and the labour ‘received’ by ν. In economies with homogeneous
labour, the former amount coincides with the labour performed by workers
in ν, Λνt .16 Outside of simple, static two-class Leontief economies with sub-
sistence wages, instead, many different definitions of the labour ‘received’
by ν can be, and have in fact been proposed, which incorporate different
normative and positive views.17 In recent work, Yoshihara and Veneziani
[34, 32, 30, 31] have proposed an axiom that identifies the domain of ad-
missible UE definitions: it imposes some weak restrictions on the notion of
labour received and all of the main approaches satisfy it in static economies.
In this subsection, we generalise their analysis and define a domain axiom for
all admissible definitions of UE exploitation in general dynamic equilibria.
In all of the main UE approaches, the amount of labour ‘received’ by agent
ν is determined by some reference bundles that are, or can be, consumed by
ν. The focus of analysis is on the income that agents do, or can devote
to consumption net of the replacement of any wealth they possess. When
focusing on static models, or on the steady state of dynamic economies, this
implies focusing on bundles that are, or can be purchased with ν’s actual net
income. In the general equilibria considered here, the choice of the relevant
budget set is not unambiguous.
Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS for E(Ω0). The gross income of each ν ∈ N
at t is given by (1 + rt) pt−1ωνt +wmaxt Λνt . In order to identify ν’s ‘net’ income
at t in this context, the fund for replenishing ν’s wealth pt−1ωνt in the next
period should be deducted after adjusting for the difference in prices between
t− 1 and t. To do so, we define the inflation index at t, Rt ≡ ptωtpt−1ωt , taking
ωt as the numéraire bundle. Given this index, ν’s wealth pt−1ωνt at t − 1 is
evaluated as being equivalent to Rtpt−1ωνt at t. Then, ν’s ‘net’ income at t
can be defined as (1 + rt) pt−1ωνt + wmaxt Λνt − Rtpt−1ωνt , and it identifies the
normatively relevant set of commodity bundles ‘received’ by ν:
Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ) ≡
©
c ∈ Rn+ | ptc = (1 + rt) pt−1ωνt + wmaxt Λνt −Rtpt−1ωνt
ª
.
In other words, the set of commodity bundles ‘received’ by ν at t is de-
16For a generalisation to economies with heterogeneous inputs and skills, see Veneziani
and Yoshihara [30, 31].
17See, for example, Morishima [19] and Roemer [22]. See Yoshihara [32, 33] and
Veneziani and Yoshihara [31] for a thorough discussion.
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fined counterfactually by considering the net income that could be devoted
to consumption if ν decided only to replace its wealth, i.e. to carry for-
ward the real asset value of W νt to the next period.
18 The reason for this
choice is threefold. First, every country ν is interested in wealth W νt , W νt+1,
rather than in the specific vector of capital endowments, ωνt , ωνt+1. Second,
from a normative perspective, for a given gross income, in every t exploita-
tion status should not depend on saving and investment decisions, or on
the specific vector of productive endowments purchased. As Roemer ([23],
p.53) forcefully argued, the appropriate notion of UE exploitation should
be preference-independent. Third, it is immediate to show that the focus on
bundles inBt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ) is a generalisation of the standard approach
and it reduces to the latter at a RS with stationary prices and capital.
Let E denote the set of all economies E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) that satisfy our
basic assumptions on technology, agents, preferences and endowments. For
all c ∈ Rn+, let ψ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | bα = c} be the set of production activities
that can produce c as net output. Given any definition of exploitation, let
N tert ⊆ N and N tedt ⊆ N denote, respectively, the set of exploiters at t, or
WPt exploiters, and the set of exploited agents at t, orWPt exploited agents,
at a given allocation, where N tert ∩N tedt = ∅. A domain axiom can now be
formally introduced that captures the basic intuitions of UE theory.
Labour Exploitation (LE):Consider any economy E(Ω0) ∈ E . Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS for E(Ω0). Given any definition of UE exploitation, in each period
t two subsets N tert ⊆ N and N tedt ⊆ N , N tert ∩ N tedt = ∅, constitute the
set of WPt exploiters and the set of WPt exploited agents if and only if for
any ν ∈ N , there exist cνt , cνt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ) such that there exist
αcνt ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with bαcνt ≯ cνt and αcνt ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with bαcνt ≯ cνt such
that αc
ν
t
l = α
cνt
l , and the following condition holds,
ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λνt < α
cνt
l ;
ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λνt > α
cνt
l .
Axiom LE requires UE exploitation status to be determined based on the
labour contributed by countries (the labour performed by their citizens) and
on the labour received by them, where the latter is determined in relation
both to purchasing power, and to productive conditions.
18The set Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ) does not necessarily contain ν’s real consumption bun-
dle at t, as ptωνt+1 may be different from Rtpt−1ωνt , in equilibrium.
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To be specific, by LE under any admissible definition, in equilibrium
the sets N tert and N
ted
t are characterised in each period t by identifying
two (possibly identical) reference commodity bundles cνt , c
ν
t ∈ Rn+ for each
ν ∈ N . The reference bundles must be affordable for any ν who simply
replaces its wealth at period t, i.e. cνt , c
ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ), and must
be technically producible as net output of efficient production activities, i.e.
αcνt ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with bαcνt ≯ cνt and αcνt ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with bαcνt ≯ cνt .
The labour contained in cνt , c
ν
t is equal to the amount of labour required to
produce them as net output, respectively, αc
ν
t
l , α
cνt
l . Given α
cνt
l = α
cνt
l , the
(possibly degenerate) interval
h
αc
ν
t
l ,α
cνt
l
i
is regarded as the labour that ν can
receive via its ‘net income’ at t and it determines ν’s UE exploitation status
at t, once compared with the labour contributed by ν, Λνt . In equilibrium,
at any t, ν is a WPt exploiter (ν ∈ N tert ) if and only if ν works less than
the minimum amount of labour αc
ν
t
l that ν can receive via its ‘net income’
(Λνt < α
cνt
l ); whereas ν is WPt exploited (ν ∈ N tedt ) if and only if ν works
more than the maximum amount of labour αc
ν
t
l that ν can receive via its ‘net
income’ (Λνt > α
cνt
l ).
Axiom LE is a rather weak condition that captures some fundamental
insights of UE exploitation theory shared by all of the main approaches in
the literature, in general convex dynamic economies. It provides a minimal
necessary condition that identifies the domain of admissible UE definitions,
but it cannot discriminate among alternative definitions within the admis-
sible domain, which can be large indeed. For this purpose, some additional
properties must be imposed. To this task we turn next.
4.2 Class, Wealth and Exploitation
A fundamental insight of UE theory is the existence of a strict relation be-
tween development - or wealth, - exploitation status, and class position in
the global economy. The existence of such relation is often proved as a
result in a given economic environment, under certain conditions. Yet its
central relevance in UE theory is such that “its epistemological status in
our understanding is as a postulate. We seek a model which will make our
postulated belief true” (Roemer [22], p.152). In this subsection, we state
this intuition axiomatically and formalise two properties that incorporate,
on the one hand, the relation between wealth and exploitation and, on the
other hand, the relation between class and exploitation status. Then, we pro-
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vide a characterisation of the class of definitions of UE exploitation (within
the admissible domain identified by LE) that satisfy both properties, in the
dynamic international economies considered here.
The first property captures the intuition that richer countries are UE
exploiters while less developed countries suffer from UE exploitation:
Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (WECP): Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) such that 1+rt−Rt > 0 for all t. For each t,
there exist W t,W t > 0 with W t =W t such that for any E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E
with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00)
with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all t:
W 0νt > W t ⇔ ν ∈ N tert ;
W 0νt < W t ⇔ ν ∈ N tedt .
WECP states that, in equilibrium, in any given period there should be
two (possibly equal) threshold wealth levels, W t,W t, such that the set of
UE exploiters (resp., UE exploited) corresponds to the set of countries with
wealth higher than W t (resp., lower than W t). The threshold levels may
depend on equilibrium prices and aggregate endowments, but not on the
equilibrium wealth distribution.
The next Lemma characterises the set of definitions that satisfyWECP.
Lemma 4 (WECP): Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0)
such that 1 + rt −Rt > 0 for all t. Given any definition of UE exploitation
satisfying LE, the following statements are equivalent :
(i) WECP holds;
(ii) at all t, there exist W t,W t > 0 with W t = W t such that for any
E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all t, and for each ν ∈ N ,
W 0νt > W t ⇔W 0νt >
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W 0νt < W t ⇔W 0νt <
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
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Proof: 1. Consider any economyE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν )ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00). Given a definition of exploitation satisfying LE, at any
t, for each ν ∈ N , there exist c0νt , c0νt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W 0νt ,Λ0νt ) such that there
exist αc0νt ∈ ψ (c0νt )∩∂P with bαc0νt ≯ c0νt and αc0νt ∈ ψ (c0νt )∩∂P with bαc0νt ≯ c0νt
such that αc
0ν
t
l = α
c0νt
l and ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ0νt < α
c0νt
l , and ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λ0νt > α
c0νt
l .
2. In order to prove the result, it is sufficient to show that for any economy
E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν )ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00), the
following conditions hold at any t and for each ν ∈ N ,
ν ∈ N tert ⇔W 0νt >
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
; (5)
ν ∈ N tedt ⇔W 0νt <
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
. (6)
Consider (5). By LE, ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ0νt < α
c0νt
l . Moreover, c
0ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W 0νt ,Λ0νt )
implies ptc
0ν
t = (1 + rt −Rt)W 0νt + wmaxt Λ0νt . Therefore Λ0νt < α
c0νt
l ⇔ α
c0νt
l >
ptc
0ν
t −(1+rt−Rt)W 0νt
wmaxt
and the desired inequality follows by rearranging the latter
expression and noting that 1 + rt −Rt > 0.
A similar argument proves that (6) also holds.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 provide two different partitions of the set of
countries, according to their UE exploitation or class status, based on wealth
inequalities. Depending on the UE definition that one adopts, the two parti-
tions may or may not coincide. Yet, as noted above, an important intuition
of UE theory is the existence of a robust relation between class and UE ex-
ploitation status. Based on Roemer [22], we formulate this intuition explicitly
in the following axiom:
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP): Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0) such that 1 + rt −Rt > 0 for all t. Then, at all t
ν ∈ C1t ⇒ ν ∈ N tert ;
ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇒ ν ∈ N tedt .
CECP formalises the relation between a country’sWP class status (and
its position in the global capital market) and its UE exploitation status: in
equilibrium, countries in the upper classes in the credit market should emerge
as UE exploiters, while those in the lower classes should be UE exploited.
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Theorem 2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a UE definition
in the admissible domain to satisfy both WECP and CECP:
Theorem 2 (CECP): Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0)
such that 1+rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t. Given any definition of UE exploitation
satisfying LE, the following statements are equivalent :
(i) WECP and CECP hold;
(ii) at all t, there exist W t,W t > 0 with pt−1αmint 5 W t 5 W t 5 pt−1αmaxt
such that for any E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and any
IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all
t, and for each ν ∈ N ,
W 0νt > W t ⇔W 0νt >
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W 0νt < W t ⇔W 0νt <
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
Proof: 1. Consider any economyE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν )ν∈N
¢
forE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00). Note that 1+rt > maxi pitpit−1 for all t implies 1+rt−Rt >
0 for all t. Given a definition of exploitation satisfying LE, at any t, for
each ν ∈ N , there exist c0νt , c0νt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W 0νt ,Λ0νt ) such that there exist
αc0νt ∈ ψ (c0νt )∩ ∂P with bαc0νt ≯ c0νt and αc0νt ∈ ψ (c0νt )∩ ∂P with bαc0νt ≯ c0νt sat-
isfying: αc
0ν
t
l = α
c0νt
l , and ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ0νt < α
c0νt
l and ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λ0νt > α
c0νt
l .
2. ((ii)⇒(i)) Suppose that (ii) holds. Then by Lemma 4 and Theorem 1
it immediately follows that WECP and CECP hold.
3. ((i)⇒(ii)) Let WECP and CECP hold. By Lemma 4, it is sufficient
to show that at all t, W t 5 pt−1αmaxt and pt−1αmint 5W t.
Take any period t and suppose, by way of contradiction, that W t >
pt−1αmaxt . We consider two cases.
Case 1: suppose that pt−1αmaxt = pt−1ω0νt , all ν ∈ N , for anyE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00)
∈ E withPν∈N ω0ν0 =Pν∈N ων0 and any IRS ¡(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N¢ forE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00)
with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all t. By Theorem 1, C1t = ∅. Moreover, because
W t > pt−1αmaxt , byWECP N tert = ∅. But then, noting that the same holds
for any W
0
t = pt−1αmaxt and that WECP does not require wealth thresholds
to be unique, it is possible to set W t = pt−1αmaxt
Case 2: suppose that there exists an economy E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E withP
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and an IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00)
with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all t, such that pt−1αmaxt < pt−1ω0νt , for some
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ν ∈ N . If pt−1αmaxt < pt−1ω0νt 5 W t, then the desired contradiction fol-
lows from Theorem 1, CECP, and WECP. So, suppose that pt−1αmaxt <
W t < pt−1ω0νt . Then by Lemma 2 it is immediate to show that there exists
another economy E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω000) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω00ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and an
IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ00ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω000) with
P
ν∈N ω00νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all
t, such that pt−1αmaxt < pt−1ω00νt 5 W t for some ν ∈ N , which yields the
desired contradiction.
A similar argument can be used to prove that pt−1αmint 5W t.
The above results fully characterise exploitative international relations
in the intertemporal model. Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 identify the struc-
ture of the global capital market, in which developed countries emerge as
net lenders and less developed countries as net borrowers. Lemma 4 derives
necessary and sufficient conditions for exploitative international relations to
map wealth inequalities, such that a country’s UE exploitation status is re-
lated to its level of economic development as proxied by the value of its
productive endowment. Finally, Theorem 2 provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for international credit relations, and class positions in the global
credit market, to map wealth inequalities and exploitation status.
Two points should be emphasised which highlight the generality of the
results. First, the above characterisations are derived without adopting any
specific definition of UE exploitation: they hold for any definition within
the admissible domain identified by LE. Thus, the relation between wealth,
class and exploitation is proved to hold for an entire (and potentially large)
class of UE definitions. Second, unlike in the rest of the literature, the results
hold in full blown intertemporal economies, under rather general assumptions
concerning preferences and technology, and without restricting the analysis
to steady state equilibria.
5 A Definition of UE Exploitation
Section 4 provides a complete characterisation of the class of UE definitions
that satisfyWECP and CECP, within the admissible domain identified by
LE, in general international dynamic economies. This immediately raises the
question whether there actually exist any definitions that satisfy the condi-
tion in Theorem 2. This is not an idle question. Yoshihara [32] has shown
that in static economies with revenue-maximising agents, some of the received
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definitions - including Morishima’s [19] and Roemer’s [22] - satisfy LE but
not CECP. Roemer [22] himself has raised doubts about the robustness of
the relation between wealth, exploitation, and class in general economies.
In this section, we show that the class of definitions identified by Theorem
2 is indeed nonempty: the definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani [34, 32, 31] satisfies LE and preservesWECP and CECP, in the
dynamic international economies considered in this paper.
Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS for E(Ω0) and let αp,rt +βp,rt denote the ag-
gregate equilibrium production activity at t. For any c ∈ Rn+, such that ptc 5
pt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´, the labour content of c is equal to τ ct (αp,rlt + βp,rlt ), where
τ ct ∈ [0, 1] is such that τ ctpt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´ = ptc.19 Thus, the labour content
of aggregate net output, bαp,rt +bβp,rt , is equal to total social labour, αp,rlt +βp,rlt ,
and the labour contained in any bundle c (whose value does not exceed global
income) is equal to the fraction τ c of social labour, τ c (αp,rlt + βp,rlt ), which is
necessary to produce a fraction of aggregate net output, τ c
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´, that
has the same value as c. We denote this amount as l.v. (c; (p, r) ,αp,rt + βp,rt ):
it is the labour value of c at t, at a RS with prices (p, r) and aggregate pro-
duction, αp,rt + βp,rt . Then:
Definition 4: Consider any economy E(Ω0) ∈ E . Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a
RS for E(Ω0). At all t, country ν ∈ N , which supplies Λνt , isWPt-exploited if
and only if Λνt > l.v. (ecνt ; (p, r) ,αp,rt + βp,rt ) for any ecνt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ),
and a WPt-exploiter if and only if Λνt < l.v. (ecνt ; (p, r) ,αp,rt + βp,rt ) for anyecνt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ).
Definition 4 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil
[5, 6]; Foley [10, 11]; Duménil et al [7]). In fact, τcνt is ν’s reference share of
world’s income, and so τcνt (αp,rlt + βp,rlt ) is the share of total social labour that
ν receives by earning national income pecνt . Then, as in the New Interpreta-
tion, country ν is UE exploited if and only if the amount of social labour it
receives is less than the amount of labour expended by its workers, Λνt .
Definition 4 has several attractive features. First, it does not rely on the
labour theory of value and it is more general than the standard approach, in
that it is not restricted to arguably special economies with Leontief or von
19If pt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´ = 0, we set τ ct = 0 by definition.
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Neumann technologies. Second, unlike in the standard approach, exploitation
is not a merely technological phenomenon and social relations play a central
role in determining exploitation status. For, in Definition 4 the definition of
UE exploitation requires knowledge of equilibrium prices and of the social
reproduction point, and it is related to the production and distribution of
global income and social labour. Third, UE exploitation is identified as
a feature of the competitive allocation of social labour rather than as the
result of productive inefficiencies, or labour market imperfections.
Fourth, Definition 4 transparently captures the fundamental intuitions
of UE theory. For it identifies exploitation status by comparing the labour
contributed by each country ν and the share of aggregate social labour re-
ceived by ν via its national income. Moreover, Yoshihara and Veneziani [34]
have shown that in a rich domain of (static) convex economies, Definition
4 is the only UE definition that satisfies a small set of formally weak and
theoretically desirable properties.20
The next result proves that if Definition 4 is adopted then both WECP
and CECP hold.
Theorem 3: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0) such that 1 + rt >
maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t. Then, under Definition 4, WECP and CECP hold.
Proof: 1. First, we show that Definition 4 satisfies LE at an IRS. Since¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
is an IRS for E(Ω0), it follows that (αp,rt + βp,rt ) ∈ Pwt (p, r)
and αp,rt + βp,rt = ωt, at all t. Further, by Lemma 2, Λ
ν
t = Λ∗t for all t and
all ν ∈ N . At all t, let (θνt )ν∈N ∈ [0, 1]N be such that
P
ν∈N θνt = 1 and
pt−1ωνt = θνt pt−1ωt for each ν ∈ N . Then, at all t,
(1 + rt) pt−1ωνt + wmaxt Λ∗t −Rtpt−1ωνt
= (1 + rt −Rt) θνt pt−1ωt + wmaxt Λ∗t
= θνt
h
pt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´− wmaxt (αp,rlt + βp,rlt )i+ wmaxt Λ∗t .
Then, because 1 + rt − Rt > 0 and wmaxt > 0, all t, in each period t, there
exists (τ νt )ν∈N ∈ (0, 1)N such that
P
ν∈N τ νt = 1 and
τ νt pt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´ = θνt hpt ³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´− wmaxt (αp,rlt + βp,rlt )i+ wmaxt Λ∗t .
20See also Yoshihara [32] for an axiomatic analysis of Definition 4 in the context of
accumulating economies.
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According to Definition 4, at all t, ν ∈ N tert if and only if Λ∗t < τ νt (αp,rlt + βp,rlt );
and ν ∈ N tedt if and only if Λ∗t > τ νt (αp,rlt + βp,rlt ). By taking cνt = cνt =
τ νt
³bαp,rt + bβp,rt ´ and αcνt = αcνt = τ νt (αp,rt + βp,rt ), for all ν ∈ N , we can see
that Definition 4 satisfies LE.
2. By step 1, it suffices to show that under Definition 4, statement (ii) of
Theorem 2 holds. Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) such
that 1 + rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t. We show that at all t, W t = W t = W
∗
t ≡
1
N
pt−1ωt > 0 satisfies all conditions in statement (ii).
First of all, note that for any E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =P
ν∈N ων0 and any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
forE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =P
ν∈N ωνt , all t, W ∗t is well defined, unique and invariant.
Further, for any E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and
any IRS
¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt ,
all t, for each ν ∈ N , we have
ptbαc0νt − wmaxt αc0νtl = τ νt hpt ³bα0p,rt + bβ0p,rt ´− wmaxt ¡α0p,rlt + β0p,rlt ¢i
= τ νt
h
(1 + rt) pt−1
³
α0p,rt + β0p,rt
´
− pt
³
α0p,rt + β0p,rt
´i
= τ νt (1 + rt −Rt) pt−1ωt.
where the first equality follows from step 1, the second equality follows from
the fact that
¡
α0p,rt + β0p,rt
¢
∈ Pwt (p, r) at a RS, and the last equality follows
from the definition of Rt noting that at a RS α0p,rt + β0p,rt = ωt. Then, sincebαc0νt = c0νt = bαc0νt = c0νt and αc0νt = αc0νt by step 1, it immediately follows
that for any E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) ∈ E with
P
ν∈N ω0ν0 =
P
ν∈N ων0 and any IRS¡
(p, r) , (ξ0ν)ν∈N
¢
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω00) with
P
ν∈N ω0νt =
P
ν∈N ωνt , all t, for
each ν ∈ N ,
W 0νt > W
∗
t ⇔W 0νt >
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W 0νt < W
∗
t ⇔W 0νt <
ptc
0ν
t − wmaxt α
c0νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
Finally, sinceW ∗t =
1
N
pt−1ωt = pt−1
³α0p,rt +β0p,rt
N
´
,
¡
α0p,rt + β0p,rt
¢
∈ Pwt (p, r)
implies that pt−1αmint 5W ∗t 5 pt−1αmaxt .
In summary, statement (ii) of Theorem 2 holds under Definition 4 and
therefore WECP and CECP hold under Definition 4.
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Theorem 3 implies that the set of definitions identified in Lemma 4 and
Theorem 2 is nonempty. If Definition 4 is adopted, then both Roemer’s
([22], pp.78ff) Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle and the Wealth-
Exploitation Correspondence Principle can be generalised to the dynamic
equilibrium paths of international economies with general convex technologies
and welfare functions, without restricting attention to steady states.
If equilibria with stationary prices and zero net savings are considered,
however, a more detailed picture of exploitative international relations can be
derived and the standard insights of UE exploitation can be generalised fur-
ther. First of all, in a dynamic context, UE exploitation status can be defined
focusing either on exploitative relations within a given period -WPt exploita-
tion - or on the whole life of a generation -WL exploitation. We next provide
theWL extension of Definition 4. Let∆ν =PT−1t=0 (Λνt − l.v. (ecνt ; (p, r) ,αp,rt + βp,rt )).
Definition 5: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be a RS. Agents in country ν are UE
exploited during their whole life, or WL exploited if and only if ∆ν > 0; they
are WL exploiters if and only if ∆ν < 0.
Definitions 4 and 5 incorporate different normative concerns. The WL
definition reflects the intuition that, from a country’s viewpoint, to be UE
exploited in every period is certainly worse than being exploited only in some
periods. An analysis based on the WP definition captures the idea that the
existence of UE exploitation is morally relevant per se, and a global economy
where countries switch their exploitation status over time is not necessar-
ily just. This distinction, however, is not relevant in stationary equilibria
where the two criteria provide exactly the same information on the nature of
exploitative international relations.21
At all t, let W ∗t =
1
N
pt−1ωt. Given Definitions 4 and 5, the next results
follow immediately from Theorems 1-3 at a stationary equilibrium:
Corollary 1: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0) such that at all t,
ωνt = ων0 for all ν ∈ N , pt−1 = pt, and rt > 0. Under Definitions 4 and 5,
for all ν ∈ N :
(i) ν ∈ N tedt for all t, and ∆ν > 0 if and only if W ν0 < W ∗0 ;
(ii) ν ∈ N tert for all t, and ∆ν < 0 if and only if W ν0 > W ∗0 .
Corollary 2: Let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0) such that at all
21For a thorough discussion of WP and WL views, see Veneziani [28, 29].
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t, ωνt = ων0 for all ν ∈ N , and pt−1 = pt. Under Definitions 4 and 5, the
following three statements are equivalent :
(i) rt > 0 for all t;
(ii) if ν ∈ C10 , then ν ∈ C1 and ν ∈ N tert for all t, and ∆ν < 0;
(iii) if ν ∈ C30 ∪ C40 , then ν ∈ C3 ∪ C4 and ν ∈ N tedt for all t, and ∆ν > 0.
Corollaries 1 and 2 generalise Roemer’s [22, 23] analysis of exploitative
international relations to the intertemporal model. At a steady state, both
class and UE exploitation status depend on a country’s initial wealth: the
level of development of a country at t = 0 determines its location in the
international class and UE exploitation structure in every subsequent period
and over the entire lifetime of a generation. Moreover, the Class-Exploitation
Correspondence Principle holds both in each period and over the lifetime
of a generation, as there exists a WP and WL correspondence between a
country’s position in the capital market and its exploitation status.
In summary, if one adopts Definitions 4-5, Theorems 1 and 3, and Corol-
laries 1-2 allow us to identify the structure of dependent and exploitative
international relations emerging between developed and less developed coun-
tries as the equilibrium outcome of a perfectly competitive international econ-
omy, both in each period and (provided one focuses on stationary states) over
the whole life of a generation. Mutual benefits from free international trade
of commodities and capital coexist with an international stratification of
countries in the credit market and with unequal flows of revenue and labour.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the phenomenon of unequal exchange between coun-
tries. A dynamic general equilibrium model is set up, which generalises
Roemer’s [22, 23] economy with a global capital market. First, the inter-
national class structure is completely characterised: a country’s class status
in the global capital market is determined in a general dynamic equilib-
rium as a function of its level of development (proxied by the value of the
country’s productive assets). Developed countries emerge as net lenders in
the credit market, whereas less developed countries must borrow in order
to optimise. Then, the structure of unequal exchange between countries is
analysed axiomatically. The class of definitions that preserve three funda-
mental properties of UE exploitation theory - including the existence of a
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correspondence between wealth, class and exploitation status, - in general
dynamic equilibria is completely characterised. This class is shown to be
nonempty: there exists a UE definition that satisfies a basic domain axiom
and both the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle and the Class-
Exploitation Correspondence Principle. This definition is conceptually re-
lated to the so-called ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [5, 6]; Foley [10, 11];
Duménil et al [7]). It is logically consistent and general, and is firmly an-
chored to empirically observed data.
Based on this definition, unequal international relations are fully charac-
terised and Roemer’s [22, 23] results generalised. In equilibrium, countries
are partitioned based on their UE exploitation status and on their position in
the capital market: advanced countries are net lenders and exploiters, less de-
veloped countries are net borrowers and suffer from UE exploitation. Mutual
gains from trade and UE exploitation coexist in competitive markets. The
exploitative nature of international relations is the product of capital flows,
which transfer surplus from less developed to more developed countries.22
This provides a normative benchmark to evaluate international relations
under globalisation. For, inequalities in wealth and development among
countries are at least partly due to past “robbery and plunder” - especially
during the colonial period - which makes them, and the unequal exchanges
and exploitative relations resulting from them hardly justifiable. To be sure,
the radical change in ownership relations in the world economy necessary
to eliminate UE exploitation may be considered politically infeasible. This
does not make the concept of UE exploitation any less relevant. For it is
essential to establish a robust normative benchmark against which to eval-
uate international relations, and even if it is not possible to eliminate UE
exploitation in one stroke, there may be a number of measures to reduce it
via international transfers and redistribution. An interesting question from
this perspective concerns the development of a measure of the degree or in-
tensity of UE exploitation of each country, and an index of aggregate UE
exploitation in the international economy that goes beyond the rather coarse
22Empirical studies on the role of international capital markets and capital flows across
countries reach mixed conclusions. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that our
analysis does capture some relevant aspects of globalisation. As Nolan and Zhang ([20],
p.101) have noted, “Between 1980 and 2008, the globalization decades, companies from
the advanced capitalist core increased their outward stock of FDI from $503 billion to
$13,623 billion. Developing-country firms also increased their outward stock of FDI, but
by 2008 their total amounted to less than a fifth of the core’s.”
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classification into UE exploiting and UE exploited nations. We leave this
issue for further research.
A Inequalities and the persistence of UE
We have shown that there exists a logically consistent and theoretically ro-
bust definition of UE exploitation (indeed, an entire class of definitions) that
allows us to analyse the class and exploitation structure of the global econ-
omy in a rather general dynamic setting. In this appendix, we exploit the
dynamic nature of our model in order to provide some preliminary insights
on two related issues, namely the normative relevance of unequal exchange
between countries, and the role of power, force and coercion in international
exploitative relations.
It is often argued that in the global economy, international institutions
and the use of force play a qualitatively different role with respect to the
past, and thus traditional UE theories are inadequate. Even granting this
(by no means uncontroversial) claim to be true, the model suggests that the
notion of UE exploitation does provide relevant insights on international rela-
tions. UE exploitation emerges as the equilibrium feature of a global economy
due to inequalities in development and wealth, and the functioning of global
markets for commodities and capital, all of which are relevant features of
the contemporary global economy. Exploitative international relations take
the form of an international transfer of surplus mediated by the capital mar-
ket. Yet, from a normative viewpoint, the fact that exploitative international
relations derive from voluntary market interactions hardly makes them jus-
tifiable; UE can be condemned even if competitive conditions prevail and
all countries gain from trade. Actually, although an exploitation-based ap-
proach has been adopted so far, the unfairness of international relations can
also be analysed by focusing on international ‘welfare’ inequalities.
At all t, let Λ∗t be defined as in Lemma 2: recall that at any t, Λ∗t is only
a function of (pt−1, pt, rt). The next Theorem characterises an important set
of solutions to MP ν .
Theorem A1: Let (p, r) be such that pt > 0, 1+ rt = maxi
pit
pit−1 , w
max
t > 0,
and
φ0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
= ρ(1 + rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
for all t, where Λ∗t is specified as in
Lemma 2. Then Λνt = Λ∗t with 0 < Λ∗t < L and ωνt+1 = ωνt for all t are
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optimal for all ν. If, in addition, pt = p and rt = 1−ρρ for all t, then
Λ∗t = Λ∗, all t, and V (ων0 ) =
¡
1− ρT
¢ hφ(L−Λ∗)+φ0(L−Λ∗)Λ∗
1−ρ +
pων0φ0(L−Λ∗)
wmaxρ
i
.
Proof: 1. Let W ⊆ Rn+ be the state space with generic element ω. The fea-
sibility correspondence Ψ : W →W is the set of feasible states at t+1 given
the state at t: Ψ(ωνt ) =
©
ωνt+1 ∈W | ptωνt+1 5 wmaxt L+ (1 + rt)pt−1ωνt
ª
. The
set of feasible sequences is
F(ων0 ) =
©
ων | ωνt+1 ∈ Ψ(ωνt ) for all t, pT−1ωνT = pT−1ων0 , and ων0 given
ª
.
Let Φ =
©
(ωνt ,ωνt+1) ∈W ×W | ωνt+1 ∈ Ψ(ωνt )
ª
be the graph of Ψ. We
can use a two-stage approach to simplify the intertemporal problem and
by Lemma 2, write the one-period return function F : Φ→ R at t as
F (ωνt ,ωνt+1) = [φ (L− Λ∗t ) + φ0 (L− Λ∗t )Λ∗t ]−
£
ptωνt+1 − (1 + rt)pt−1ωνt
¤
φ0 (L− Λ∗t )
wmaxt
.
Program MP ν can then be written as
V (ων0 )
= max
ων∈F(ων0 )
T−1X
t=0
ρt
(
[φ (L− Λ∗t ) + φ0 (L− Λ∗t )Λ∗t ]−
£
ptωνt+1 − (1 + rt)pt−1ωνt
¤
φ0 (L− Λ∗t )
wmaxt
)
.
Clearly, Ψ(ωνt ) 6= ∅ for all ωνt ∈ W. Moreover, noting that 0 < Λ∗t < L,
0 < φ0 (L− Λ∗t ) <∞, so that F is bounded, and MP ν is well defined.
2. If φ
0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
= ρ(1 + rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
for all t, then MP ν reduces to
V (ων0) = maxων∈F(ων0 )
T−1X
t=0
ρt [φ (L− Λ∗t ) + φ0 (L− Λ∗t )Λ∗t ]
+
"
(1 + r0)p−1ων0φ0 (L− Λ∗0)
wmax0
− ρT−1pT−1ω
ν
Tφ0
¡
L− Λ∗T−1
¢
wmaxT−1
#
,
and thus any ων ∈ F(ων0 ) such that pT−1ωνT = pT−1ων0 is optimal, including
ωνt = ων0 for all t.
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3. If pt = p and rt =
1−ρ
ρ , all t, then w
max
t = w
max = maxα∈P
pα−ρ−1pα
αl , all
t. Therefore, since
φ0(L−Λ∗t )
wmax
=
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmax
for all t, Λ∗t = Λ∗ holds for all t, and
the rest of the statement follows from step 2.
Theorem A1 provides some additional insights on the normative implica-
tions of the model. Consider stationary equilibria in which Roemer’s results
are fully generalised, in that the intertemporal economy is precisely the T -
fold iteration of the static model. Under Definitions 4-5, Corollaries 1 and
2 imply that wealth inequalities yield UE exploitation. By Theorem A1, for
any two countries ν, μ, if W ν0 > Wμ0 then V (ων0) > V (ωμ0 ), and thus wealth
inequalities yield welfare inequalities, too. But then according to both the
exploitation criterion and the ‘welfare’ inequality view, the model identifies
the counterfactual for exploitative international relations: exploitative in-
ternational relations should be evaluated against a benchmark economy in
which morally arbitrary differences in initial endowments are eliminated.
According to Roemer ([23], p.57), “it is not immediately clear that the
argument [for the socialization of capital within a country] applies as well to
the socialization of capital among nation-states”. This claim is not entirely
convincing. As argued by Roemer himself, at least part of the international
inequalities in capital endowments derive from acts of “robbery and plun-
der” at the expense of less developed countries during so-called primitive
accumulation by developed countries, and thus they are morally arbitrary.
Even if the socialisation of capital at the world level may seem utopian, the
model can still provide the normative foundations for capital transfers to less
developed countries as a requirement of justice, rather than charity.
Thus, our analysis confirms one of the core insights of Roemer’s theory
[22, 23]: inequalities in wealth and development are instrumental in yielding
stratification in the global capital market, and exploitative international rela-
tions. It is not clear, however, that “the unequal exchange phenomenon can
be driven entirely by different [productive endowments]” (Roemer [23], p.57,
italics in the original). This is true in Roemer’s one period, static economies
but not necessarily in the intertemporal context: Veneziani [28, 29] has shown
that, in dynamic subsistence economies, if agents are allowed to (but do not
necessarily) save, wealth inequalities are necessary for the emergence of UE
exploitation but they are not sufficient for its persistence. In the rest of the
appendix, we provide further support to this conclusion.
Consider first an IRS with pt = p, rt = r, and ωt = ω0, all t, or sta-
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tionary RS (henceforth, SRS). SRS’s are theoretically relevant and can be
considered as a normative and positive benchmark, because they allow us
to fully generalise the standard insights of UE theory, as shown in section
5 above. By Lemma 2, however, it immediately follows that at a SRS, it
must be rt = r
∗ = 1−ρρ , all t, and therefore the existence of UE exploitation
and classes crucially depends on a strictly positive rate of time preference.
If ρ = 1, then r∗ = 0 and there is no UE exploitation in the international
economy. As Veneziani [28, 29] has argued, once the dynamic nature of the
global economy is fully taken into account, UE exploitation and classes are
not driven entirely by different levels of wealth and development.
The same conclusion holds if one analyses the long run dynamics of the
economy focusing on a more general set of equilibria with stationary capital
but a time-varying price vector. This is interesting for two reasons. First, it
is well known that persistent accumulation may lead to the disappearance of
UE exploitation and classes by making capital abundant relative to labour.
As argued by Veneziani [28, 29], it is more surprising that a similar result
may hold even in economies without accumulation. Second, although initial
aggregate endowments ω0 may not be equal to the optimal level, ω∗, such that
an IRS with stationary capital exists, well-known turnpike results (McKenzie
[17]) suggest that there is a sufficiently high ρ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that for any ρ ∈
[ρ0, 1], any optimal path of capital stocks starting from a suitably restricted
initial capital stock ‘converges’ to a ‘neighbourhood’ of the stationary optimal
capital stock ω∗, as T tends to infinity.
If we focus on equilibria with stationary capital, we have the following:
Theorem A2: Let T → +∞ and let
¡
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
be an IRS for E(Ω0)
such that ωt = ω0 and 1+rt > maxi pitpit−1 for all t. Suppose that the sequence
of equilibrium interest rates {rt}
∞
t=0 is convergent. Then rT−1 → r∗ = 1−ρρ ,
as T → +∞.
Proof. 1. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that limT→∞ rT−1 = r0 > r∗.
Then, there exists a sufficiently large t0 > 0 such that for any t > t0, rt > r∗.
Take any such t > t0. By Lemma 2, at an IRS, we have φ
0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
= ρ(1 +
rt+1)
φ0(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
, all t, and therefore, for any T − 1 > t > t0,
φ0 (L− Λ∗t )
wmaxt
= ρT−t−1
T−t−1Y
k=1
(1 + rt+k)
φ0
¡
L− Λ∗T−1
¢
wmaxT−1
. (7)
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Because rt > r
∗ for all t > t0, we have limT→∞ ρT−t−1
T−t−1Y
k=1
(1 + rt+k) = ∞.
Therefore, since at any IRS, 0 < φ
0(L−Λ∗t )
wmaxt
<∞ at all t, equation (7) can hold
only if limT→∞
φ0(L−Λ∗T−1)
wmax
T−1
= 0. We show that this is not possible at an IRS,
yielding the desired contradiction.
2. First we prove that limT→∞wmaxT−1 < ∞. At an IRS with ωt = ω0 and
1 + rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t, by Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, at all T − 1,
wmaxT−1 =
pT−1
³
αp,rT−1 + β
p,r
T−1
´
− (1 + rT−1) pT−2
³
αp,rT−1 + βp,rT−1
´
N
¡
αp,rlT−1 + βp,rlT−1
¢
=
pT−1
³
αp,rT−1 + β
p,r
T−1
´
− (1 + rT−1) pT−2ω0
NΛ∗T−1
. (8)
To see that the numerator of (8) is bounded above, note, first, that 1 +
rT−1 > maxi
piT−1
piT−2
holds for all T , and {rt}
∞
t=0 is convergent. Next, we show
that
n³
αp,rt + β
p,r
t
´o∞
t=0
is bounded above. Let
Pω0,NL ≡ {α0 ∈ P | α0 = ω0 & α0l ∈ [0, NL]} .
By A1 and the cone property of P , Pω0,NL is bounded and so compact.
Note that {(αp,rt + βp,rt )}∞t=0 ⊆ Pω0,NL. For any α ∈ Pω0,NL, let F (α) ≡
maxi=1,...,n
αi
αl . By the nontriviality of the IRS, F (α
p,r
t + βp,rt ) > 0, all t.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
n³
αp,rt + β
p,r
t
´o∞
t=0
is unbounded
above. Then limT→∞ supα∈{(αp,rt +βp,rt )}
T−1
t=0
F (α) = ∞. Without loss of gen-
erality, let supα∈{(αp,rt +β
p,r
t )}
T−1
t=0
F (α) = F
¡
αp,rT−1 + βp,rT−1
¢
. Then,
lim
T→∞
sup
α∈{(αp,rt +βp,rt )}
T−1
t=0
F (α) = F (α0) =∞
for α0 = limT→∞
¡
αp,rT−1 + βp,rT−1
¢
. By the boundedness of Pω0,NL, F (α0) =∞
implies α0l = 0. However, since P is closed, α0 ∈ P , which contradicts A1.
Thus,
n³
αp,rt + β
p,r
t
´o∞
t=0
is bounded from above.
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To see that the denominator of (8) is bounded away from zero, note thatn³
αp,rt + β
p,r
t
´o∞
t=0
is also bounded from below, since αp,rt + β
p,r
t > ω0 ≥ 0
holds at all t. Therefore, limT→∞NΛ∗T−1 > 0 by A1.
In summary, we have limT→∞wmaxT−1 <∞.
3. Next, observe that limT→∞NΛ∗T−1 > 0 and the assumptions on φ
imply that limT→∞ φ0
¡
L− Λ∗T−1
¢
> 0. But then limT→∞
φ0(L−Λ∗T−1)
wmax
T−1
> 0,
which yields the desired contradiction. Hence, limT→∞ rT−1 = r0 5 r∗.
4. A similar argument proves that limT→∞ rT−1 = r0 = r∗, and therefore
limT→∞ rT−1 = r∗, as desired.
Theorem A2 states that at any dynamic equilibrium in which aggregate
capital remains constant, if the sequence of equilibrium interest rates is con-
vergent, it converges to the rate r∗ = 1−ρρ that supports a SRS.
23 Therefore, in
the long run, unless ρ < 1, UE exploitation and the correspondence between
WP class and exploitation status cease to exist. If ρ = 1, the exploitation
and class structure of the dynamic international economy is not persistent,
even if inequalities in wealth and development remain unchanged over time.
To be sure, it may be argued that a strictly positive rate of time prefer-
ence, ρ < 1, is empirically reasonable and a standard assumption in neoclas-
sical growth theory, and so UE exploitation and classes are indeed explained
by wealth inequalities. Yet, as argued by Veneziani [28, 29], from a normative
perspective, a theory of unequal exchange between countries that crucially
relies on time preference does not seem fully satisfactory. Rather, we inter-
pret the above results as suggesting that in a perfectly competitive context
wealth inequalities are necessary for the emergence of UE exploitation and
classes, but not sufficient for their persistence. Wealth inequalities are funda-
mental to understand, and normatively evaluate, unequal exchange between
countries, but they do not provide the full picture. In the international arena,
some other asymmetries in power, technology, access to credit, and so on,
are likely to play a fundamental role in explaining the persistence of UE ex-
ploitation and class. But a proper analysis of these factors is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
23It can be proved that there exists a stationary price vector of commodities p∗ corre-
sponding to r∗ = 1−ρρ such that the iteration path of the vector (p
∗, r∗) supports a SRS
for an appropriately selected ω0. See the Addendum for a thorough analysis.
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1
1 Existence of a SRS
In this Addendum, we prove the existence of a RS with constant prices,
interest rate, and aggregate capital. Formally, a Stationary Reproducible
Solution (SRS) is a RS such that at all t, pt+1 = pt, rt+1 = rt and ωνt+1 = ωνt
for all ν ∈ N .
By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, for any given intertemporal price vec-
tor (p, r) = {(p, rt)}
T−1
t=0 , for all ν, the set of individually optimal solutions
Oν (p, r) always contains vectors ξν = (0, βν , zν , δν , cν ,ων ) such that, at all
t, wmaxt βνlt+rtzνt = p
¡
cνt + ωνt+1 − ωνt
¢
with zνt = pωνt , wmaxt ≡ maxα∈P pα−rtpααl ,
and - given that we shall focus on equilibria with rt = 0, - δνt = 0. Thus,
problem MP ν can be reduced to the following form:
max
ξν
T−1X
t=0
ρtu (cνt , L− Λνt ) ,
subject to
wmaxt βνlt + rtzνt = p
¡
cνt + ωνt+1 − ωνt
¢
,
zνt = pωνt ,
βνt ∈ Pwt (p, r), βνlt = Λνt 5 L,
pωνT = pων0 .
Then, by Lemma 2, in order to prove the existence of a SRS, it suffices
to focus on the Euler equation p
wmaxt
φ0 (L− Λ∗t ) = ρ(1+rt+1) pwmaxt+1 φ
0
¡
L− Λ∗t+1
¢
for all t. LetM≡
©
qt ∈ Rn+ |
Pn
i=1 qit = 1
ª
andM+≡
©
qt ∈ Rn++ |
Pn
i=1 qit = 1
ª
.
To begin with, consider the function w(p,r
∗) ≡ maxα∈P pα−r
∗pα
αl , where
r∗ = 1−ρρ . Define ew(r) = minp∈Mmaxα∈P pα−rpααl . Note that ew(0) > 0 and
that ew(r) is continuous. This implies that there exists an interval Ir = [0, r]
such that for all r ∈ Ir, wmaxt = maxα∈P ptα−rtptααl = 0 for all p ∈M. Let
ρ ≡ 1
1+r
: if ρ ∈ [ρ, 1], then r∗ = 1−ρρ = 0 guarantees w(p,r
∗) = 0 for all p ∈M.
In what follows, we assume ρ ∈ (ρ, 1].1 Therefore, if p ∈M+ and rt = r∗ = 0
1This is without loss of generality because Proposition 1 rules out the possibility that
wmaxt = w
max
t+1 = w
(p,r∗) = 0 at an IRS.
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for all t, then wmaxt = w
max
t+1 = w
(p,r∗) > 0 all t, and the Euler equation is
well-defined with Λ∗t = Λ∗t+1 = Λ∗ all t.
Moreover, by the assumptions on u, wmaxt = w
max
t+1 = w
(p,r∗) > 0 and
pt+1 = pt, all t, imply that the structure of individual consumption demand
will be constant over time, with cνt = k
ν
t c
¡
p
w(p,r
∗)
¢
for some kνt = 0, all t, and
all ν ∈ N . Finally, note that if (p, r) is a SRS such that rt = r∗ for all t, then
wmaxt = w
max
t+1 for all t, implies that
bβt = bβt+1 and ct = ct+1 = k∗c ¡ pw(p,r∗) ¢
for all t, where k∗ =
P
ν∈N k
ν. Let Pw
(p,r∗)
=
n
α ∈ P | w(p,r∗) = pα−r∗pααl
o
.
Because βt,βt+1 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
, bβt = bβt+1 and βt = βt+1 imply βt = βt+1 for all
t.
In order to show the existence of an SRS, we first show the existence
of a one-period temporary reproducible solution, which focuses on resource
allocation in period t = 0. In this model, in fact, the one-period indi-
vidual optimisation programmes can be reduced to a social planner’s prob-
lem. Formally, given p ∈M+, let fmin (p) ≡ minβ0∈Pw(p,r∗)
pβ
0
βl0
and fmax (p) ≡
maxβ0∈Pw
(p,r∗)
pβ
0
βl0
. Then, given p ∈M+, the planner will solve the following
optimisation problem SMP : for any given f (p) ∈
£
fmin (p) , fmax (p)
¤
,
max
β0,(cν0)ν∈N ,(Λ
ν
0 )ν∈N

X
ν∈N
u (cν0, L− Λν0)
subject to
w(p,r
∗)βl0 + r∗pβ0 =
X
ν∈N
pcν0, β0 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
,
βl0 =
X
ν∈N
Λν0 5 NL,
pβ
0
βl0
= f (p) .
Denote the set of solutions to SMP at p ∈M+ for a given f (p) ∈£
fmin (p) , fmax (p)
¤
by
O (p, r∗; f (p)) ≡
©¡
β0, (cν0)ν∈N , (Λν0)ν∈N
¢
solving SMP for a given f(p)
ª
.
Moreover, define the set
O (p, r∗) = ∪f(p)∈[fmin(p),fmax(p)]O (p, r∗; f (p))
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with generic element
¡
β0 (p, r∗) , (cν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N , (Λν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N
¢
.
We show the existence of p∗ ∈M+ such that there exists¡
β0 (p, r∗) , (cν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N , (Λν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N
¢
∈ O (p∗, r∗)
with the property that bβ0 (p∗, r∗) = Pν∈N cν0 (p∗, r∗). Let E(P,N , u, ρ) de-
note the economy with technology P , agents N , and welfare function u with
discount factor ρ, where both aggregate productive endowments and their
distribution are left unspecified. Formally, define the following solution con-
cept.
Definition 1A:A temporary quasi-reproducible solution (TQRS) for E(P,N , u, ρ)
is a p ∈M+ and an associated (c0,β0) ∈ Rn+ × P such that
(i) there exists a profile
¡
β0 (p, r∗) , (cν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N , (Λν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N
¢
∈ O (p, r∗)
such that β0 (p, r∗) = β0,
P
ν∈N c
ν
0 (p, r
∗) = c0, and
P
ν∈N Λν0 (p, r∗) = β0l;
(ii) bβ0 = c0.
Definition 1A is called a quasi-reproducible solution because it states
that the social consumption and production vectors are optimal and aggre-
gate output is sufficient to replace inputs and to satisfy consumption, but it
imposes no constraint on aggregate social endowments. In order to analyse
the existence of a TQRS, for all p ∈M+, let us define:
B(p, r∗) ≡
n
(c0, β0) ∈ Rn+ × Pw
(p,r∗)
| pc0 = r
∗pβ
0
+ w(p,r
∗)βl0; 0 5 βl0 5 NL
o
.
Moreover, let f∗ ≡ maxp∈Mmaxβ∈Pw(p,r∗)
pβ
βl
and let W0 ≡ f∗NL. The follow-
ing set can also be defined:
B(p, r∗) ≡
n
(c0, β0) ∈ Rn+ × P | pc0 = r∗pβ0 + w
(p,r∗)βl0; pβ0 5W0; 0 5 βl0 5 NL
o
.
Note that B(p, r∗) ⊆ B(p, r∗) holds for any p ∈M+. Then:
Lemma 1A: Assume ρ ∈ (ρ, 1]. The correspondence B is non-empty,
compact-valued and convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+. More-
over, B is non-empty, closed-valued, convex-valued, and continuous on M+.
Proof. It is easy to see that B(p, r∗) is non-empty, closed, and convex for
all p ∈M+. We now prove that it is also bounded and so compact-valued.
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Let B0(p, r∗) be the set of β0 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
such that 0 5 βl0 5 NL. Since
w(p,r
∗) > 0, then for any β0 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
, pβ0 > 0 holds, which implies that its
corresponding βl0 is positive by A1. Then, because of 0 5 βl0 5 NL and
the convex cone property of P , B0(p, r∗) is bounded. Next, let C0(p, r∗) be
the set of c0 ∈ Rn+ such that pc0 5 r∗W0 + w(p,r
∗)NL. Clearly, C0(p, r∗) is
bounded for any p ∈M+. Therefore, C0(p, r∗)× B0(p, r∗) is bounded for any
p ∈M+. Since B(p, r∗) is a subset of C0(p, r∗)× B0(p, r∗), it is also bounded
for any p ∈M+. Hence, B(p, r∗) is compact for any p ∈M+.
It is obvious that B is non-empty, closed-valued, and convex-valued.
Let us prove the continuity of B. To show this, note that since w(p,r
∗) > 0
then r∗W0+w(p,r
∗)NL > 0 for all p ∈M+. The latter property, together with
the fact that r∗W0+w(p,r
∗)NL is continuous on p ∈M+, implies that B(p, r∗)
is continuous at each p ∈M+.
Finally, let us show that B is upper hemi-continuous on M+. Let p
υ → p,
(cυ0 , βυ0 ) ∈ B (pυ , r∗), and (cυ0 , βυ0 ) → (c0,β0). We need to show (c0, β0) ∈
B (p, r∗). Since B (pυ , r∗) ⊆ B (pυ , r∗) and B is upper hemi-continuous,
(c0, β0) ∈ B(p, r∗). Suppose (c0, β0) /∈ B (p, r∗). This implies β0 /∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
.
Then, there exists (c00,β00) ∈ B(p, r∗) such that
pβ00−r∗pβ00
β0l0
>
pβ0−r∗pβ0
βl0
. Since
B is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence {(c0υ0 ,β0υ0 )} such that for
each pυ , (c0υ0 ,β0υ0 ) ∈ B(pυ , r∗) and (c0υ0 , β0υ0 ) → (c00, β00) as pυ → p. Then, for
pυ which is sufficiently close to p, pνβ
0υ
0 −r∗pνβ0υ0
β0υl0
>
pνβυ0−r∗pνβυ0
βυl0
. However, this
is a contradiction, since βυ0 ∈ Pw
(pυ ,r∗)
. Thus, (c0, β0) ∈ B (p, r∗).
Given Lemma 1A, we can prove some important properties of O (p, r∗).
Lemma 2A: Assume ρ ∈ (ρ, 1]. The correspondence O is non-empty,
compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+.
Proof. Given (p, r∗) with p ∈M+, w(p,r∗) > 0 is uniquely specified. Therefore,
by the assumptions on u, the profile of optimal labour supply (Λν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N
is uniquely determined, with Λν0 (p, r∗) = Λ∗0 (p, r∗) for all ν ∈ N and 0 <
Λ∗0 (p, r∗) < L. Moreover, by the linear homogeneity and strict quasi-concavity
of v, there exists a unique consumption vector c
(p,r∗)
0 satisfying
v0i

c
(p,r∗)
0

v0j

c
(p,r∗)
0
 = pi
pj
for all i, j, and pc
(p,r∗)
0 = w
(p,r∗)NΛ∗0 (p, r∗). Take any profile (λν)ν∈N ∈ RN++
with
P
ν∈N λν = 1. Then,
¡
β0, (cν0)ν∈N , (Λν0 )ν∈N
¢
∈ O (p, r∗) if and only if
5
Λν0 (p, r∗) = Λ∗0 (p, r∗) for all ν ∈ N , and for some f (p) ∈
£
fmin (p) , fmax (p)
¤
,
cν0 = λν
³
r∗f(p)
w(p,r
∗) + 1
´
c
(p,r∗)
0 for each ν ∈ N , and β0 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
such that
βl0 = NΛ∗0 (p, r∗) and pβ0 = f (p)NΛ
∗
0 (p, r
∗). Therefore O (p, r∗) is non-
empty for each p ∈M+. The convexity of O (p, r∗) for each p ∈M+ can be
proved in the standard manner. Since B(p, r∗) is compact-valued by Lemma
1A and O (p, r∗) is closed-valued, O (p, r∗) is compact for any p ∈M+. We
need to prove upper hemi-continuity.
LetF :M+³ R+ be such that for each p ∈M+, F (p) ≡
£
fmin (p) , fmax (p)
¤
:
F is easily shown to be upper hemi-continuous. Then, since w(p,r
∗) and c
(p,r∗)
0
are continuous at every p ∈M+, we have the following property: if pυ → p,
then λν
³
r∗f(pυ )
w(p
υ ,r∗) + 1
´
c
(pυ ,r∗)
0 → λν
³
r∗f(p)
w(p,r
∗) + 1
´
c
(p,r∗)
0 holds for each ν ∈ N ,
where f (pυ) ∈ F (pυ) for each pυ and f (p) ∈ F (p). Also, since Λ∗0 (p, r∗)
is continuous at every p ∈M+ and Pw(
p,r∗)
is upper hemi-continuous at every
p ∈M+, if pυ → p, βυ0 → β0, where βυ0 ∈ Pw
(pυ ,r∗)
such that βυl0 = NΛ∗0 (pυ , r∗)
and pυβυ
0
= f (pυ)NΛ∗0 (pυ , r∗) for each pυ , then β0 ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
such that
βl0 = NΛ∗0 (p, r∗) and pβ0 = f (p)NΛ
∗
0 (p, r
∗). These arguments ensure that
O is upper hemi-continuous on M+.
Given Lemmas 1A and 2A, we can now prove the existence of a TQRS.
Lemma 3A: Assume ρ ∈ (ρ, 1]. Then, a TQRS exists for E(P,N , u, ρ).
Proof. 1. For any p ∈M+, let us define:
Z (p) ≡
(X
ν∈N
cν0 − bβ0 | ¡β0, (cν0)ν∈N , (Λν0)ν∈N¢ ∈ O (p, r∗)
)
.
It is easy to check that by Lemma 2A, the correspondence Z is non-empty,
compact-valued and convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous onM+. More-
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over, for any z (p) ∈ Z (p), pz (p) = 0 holds. This is because
pz (p) = p
"X
ν∈N
cν0 (p, r
∗)− bβ0 (p, r∗)
#
=
X
ν∈N
pcν0 (p, r
∗)− pbβ0 (p, r∗)
=
X
ν∈N
pcν0 (p, r
∗)−
"
pbβ0 (p, r∗)− r∗pβ0 (p, r∗)
βl0 (p, r∗)
βl0 (p, r∗) + r∗pβ0 (p, r
∗)
#
=
X
ν∈N
pcν0 (p, r
∗)−
h
w(p,r
∗)βl0 (p, r∗) + r∗pβ0 (p, r
∗)
i
by β0 (p, r∗) ∈ Pw
(p,r∗)
= 0 by
¡
β0 (p, r∗) , (cν0 (p, r∗))ν∈N , (Λ∗0 (p, r∗))ν∈N
¢
∈ O (p, r∗) .
2. Let us prove that for every sequence qm → q, q ∈M \ M+ and zm ∈
Z (qm), there is a p ∈M+ - which may depend on {qm} - such that p · zm > 0
for infinitely manym. Consider any price vector q ∈M \ M+, such that qi = 0
for one i. Then one may choose p ∈M+ such that pj = ε > 0 for sufficiently
small ε and for all j 6= i, and pi = 1−(n− 1) ε. By the strict monotonicity of
u, and noting that bβ0 (qm) is bounded from below by zero as well as bounded
from above by βl0 (qm) 5 NL, it follows that zmi > 0 for qm sufficiently close
to q. Thus, there exists a neighbourhood B(q, δ) of q such that p · zm > 0 for
all qm ∈ B(q, δ)∩ M+. A similar argument holds if q ∈M \ M+, with qi = 0,
for more than one i.
3. Given steps 1 and 2, it is possible to use Lemma 1 in Grandmont [1],
which establishes that there exists p∗ ∈M+ such that there exists z∗ (p∗) ∈
Z (p∗) such that z∗ (p∗) = 0. Thus, bβ∗0 (p∗, r∗) = c∗0 (p∗, r∗) ≡Pν∈N c∗ν0 (p∗, r∗)
holds for
¡
β∗0 (p∗, r∗) , (c∗ν0 (p∗, r∗))ν∈N , (Λ∗0 (p∗, r∗))ν∈N
¢
∈ O (p∗, r∗). Thus,
(p∗; c∗0 (p
∗, r∗) ,β∗0 (p∗, r∗)) is a TQRS.
The existence of a Stationary Reproducible Solution can now be proved.
Theorem 1A: Assume ρ ∈ (ρ, 1]. There exists an aggregate capital endow-
ment ω0 ∈ Rn+ such that for any profile (ων0 )ν∈N ∈ RnN+ with
P
ν∈N ων0 = ω0,
there exists a SRS for the economy E(P,N , u, ρ, (ων0 )ν∈N ).
Proof. By Lemma 3A, there exists (p∗; (c∗0 (p
∗, r∗) ,β∗0 (p∗, r∗))) that is a
TQRS for E(P,N , u, ρ). Let (p∗, r∗) be such that p∗t = p∗ and r∗t = r∗,
all t. We shall prove that if ω0 = β∗0 (p
∗, r∗), then for any profile of capital
endowments (ων0 )ν∈N ∈ RnN+ such that
P
ν∈N ων0 = ω0, there exists a suit-
able profile of actions (ξν )ν∈N such that
¡
(p∗, r∗) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
is a SRS for the
economy E(P,N , u, ρ, (ων0 )ν∈N ).
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1. Let (ων0 )ν∈N ∈ RnN+ be any profile of capital endowments such thatP
ν∈N ων0 = ω0 = β∗0 (p
∗, r∗). Then for each ν ∈ N , consider the vector
ξν = (αν , βν , zν , δν , cν ,ων ) constructed as follows: at all t, ανt = 0, βνt ∈
Pw
(p∗,r∗)
with βνt = 1Nβ
∗
0 (p
∗, r∗), βνlt = Λ∗0 (p∗, r∗), zνt = p∗ων0 , δνt = 0, cνt =
r∗p∗ων0+w(p
∗,r∗)Λ∗0(p∗,r∗)
p∗β∗0(p∗,r∗)
c∗0 (p
∗, r∗), and ωνt+1 = ωνt . Note that, by construction,
cνt = k
ν
t c
¡
p∗
w(p
∗,r∗)
¢
and βνlt = Λ∗0 (p∗, r∗) < L for all t, ν. Given (p∗, r∗), it
follows from Theorem A1 that ξν ∈ Oν (p∗, r∗) for all ν ∈ N and Definition
1(i) is satisfied.
2. By construction, it follows that, at all t,
P
ν∈N βνt = β∗0 (p∗, r∗),P
ν∈N c
ν
t = c
∗
0 (p
∗, r∗),
P
ν∈N
¡
ωνt+1 − ωνt
¢
= 0, and
P
ν∈N z
ν
t = p
∗β∗
0
(p∗, r∗).
By Lemma 3A, this implies that parts (ii) and (iv) of Definition 1 are also
satisfied. Since
P
ν∈N ανt = 0 for all t, then Definition 1(iii) is satisfied by
the assumption ω0 = β∗0 (p
∗, r∗). And Definition 1(v) is clearly satisfied.
Therefore
¡
(p∗, r∗) , (ξν )ν∈N
¢
is a SRS for E(P,N , u, ρ, (ων0 )ν∈N ).
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